We investigate Project Finance as a private response to ine¢ ciencies created by weak legal protection of outside investors. We o¤er a new illustration that law matters by demonstrating that for large investment projects, Project Finance provides a contractual and organizational substitute for investor protection laws. Project Finance accomplishes this by making cash ‡ows veri…able, thereby enhancing debt capacity. Two features of Project Finance make cash ‡ows veri…able: (i) contractual arrangements made possible by structuring the Project Company as a single, discrete project legally separate from the sponsor; and (ii) private enforcement of these contracts through a network of project accounts that ensures lender control of project cash ‡ows.
Introduction
The law and …nance literature (La Porta et. al., 1997 highlights that legal rules protecting outside investors vary systematically across countries. As the Coase Theorem (Coase, 1960) predicts, market participants often respond to the ine¢ ciencies from weak legal protection of outside investors by resorting to contractual and private enforcement mechanisms. In this paper, we investigate one instance of this broader phenomenon. We examine Project Finance as a private response to the risks posed by the …nancing of large investment projects in countries with weak legal protection of outside investors. 1 We observe that Project Finance is considerably more prevalent, relative to Corporate Debt Finance, in French than in English legal origin countries. Since investor protection laws are weaker in French legal origin countries than in the English legal origin countries (LLSV, 1997 (LLSV, , 1998 , this suggests that investor protection laws may be important in determining the choice of Project Finance versus Corporate Debt Finance.
When a country's corporate and bankruptcy laws provide weak investor protection, Corporate Debt Finance (hereafter CDF) can lead to expropriation of outside investors -including creditors -by corporate insiders. Firms and their lenders may respond by employing Project Finance (hereafter PF), where extensive contracts combine with private enforcement mechanisms to limit borrower discretion on cash ‡ows. The resulting increase in cash ‡ow veri…ability reduces agency costs and enhances the project's debt capacity. With respect to …nancing of large investment projects, then, PF o¤ers a private contractual substitute for legal protection of outside investors.
In PF, a legally independent project company is created to own and invest in the project, and the project debt is structured without recourse to the sponsors (Nevitt and Fabozzi 2000; Esty 2003) . With this structure, project cash ‡ows become the essential means for repaying the lender. Veri…ability of cash ‡ows, therefore, becomes crucial. PF enhances veri…ability through (i) contractual constraints on cash ‡ows that are made possible by the special structuring of the PF company; and (ii) private enforcement of these contracts through a network of project accounts that are under the lender's control and into which project cash ‡ows are required to be deposited.
Contractual constraints on cash ‡ows are possible because the Project Company (i) owns only the single, discrete project for which it is created; and (ii) is legally separate from the sponsor.
Therefore, project cash ‡ows can be meaningfully separated from the sponsor's other cash ‡ows.
With CDF, by contrast, the commingling of cash ‡ows from multiple projects makes it di¢ cult to segregate project cash ‡ows. Lender monitoring of project cash ‡ows is therefore di¢ cult.
Moreover, tightly enforced cash ‡ow constraints similar to those in PF would signi…cantly impede managerial discretion in CDF, which involves not only multiple projects but also internal capital markets within the corporate entity. Therefore, contractual arrangements that are possible in PF cannot be e¤ected in CDF. The choice of PF versus CDF thus presents a trade-o¤. CDF o¤ers managerial ‡exibility with respect to allocation of cash ‡ows, but these cash ‡ows are less veri…able. 1 The importance of Project Finance is underscored by the following: though US corporations used Project Finance less often than their foreign counterparts (Kleimeier and Megginson, 2000) , their investment of $47 billion in Project Finance in 2006 exceeded the $41 billion that venture capital funds invested in startups and the $43 billion raised by US companies through IPOs in that same year (Esty and Sesia, 2007) .
Conversely, PF o¤ers cash ‡ow veri…ability, but the attendant cash ‡ow controls preclude managers from funding project-related growth opportunities from internal cash ‡ows or reallocating cash ‡ows across multiple projects, as is possible with CDF. 2 The e¤ects of investor protection laws -for our purposes, laws against insider stealing and creditor rights laws -on the choice of PF versus CDF can be understood using a simple theoretical framework that captures the above trade-o¤. A …rm …nances a project with a mix of debt and equity. As with static trade-o¤ theories of debt versus equity, the …rm's optimal level of debt trades o¤ the bene…t of tax shields against the expected deadweight costs of bankruptcy, which stem from the lender's ine¢ cient liquidation of collateral assets. We show that the expected deadweight costs of bankruptcy-and therefore debt capacity-vary with (i) the choice of PF versus CDF; (ii) legal protection against insider stealing; and (iii) creditor rights. Because project cash ‡ows are completely veri…able in PF, investor protection has no e¤ect on the borrower's ability to divert cash ‡ows, and the borrower repays the lender in full if cash ‡ows are su¢ cient. With PF, then, the probability of default is una¤ected by investor protection.
In contrast, since cash ‡ows are not fully veri…able with CDF, stronger laws against insider stealing and stronger creditor rights reduce the likelihood of default and concomitant deadweight bankruptcy costs. Stronger laws against insider stealing limit diversion of cash ‡ows. This causes a rightward shift in the entire distribution of cash ‡ows available to all claimants -creditors and equityholders. Given their concave payo¤s, creditors care about the left tail of the cash ‡ow distribution. Stronger laws against insider stealing increase the prospects for repayment and decrease the probability of default in CDF. Similarly, stronger creditor rights enhance the lender's threat to liquidate collateral assets. When cash ‡ows are not veri…able, as with CDF, the lender's threat to liquidate collateral assets is central to forcing the borrower to repay (Hart 1995) . However, the lender can liquidate collateral assets only if the legal system provides strong creditor rights.
Optimal leverage and the value of the optimally levered …rm decrease with an increase in the expected deadweight costs of bankruptcy. Since the expected deadweight costs of bankruptcy in CDF (PF) decrease with (are una¤ected by) legal protection against insider stealing and creditor rights, we predict that CDF is more likely than PF in countries where (i) the protection against insider stealing is stronger; and (ii) creditor rights in bankruptcy are stronger. Laws against insider stealing and creditor rights likely also have an interactive e¤ect on the expected deadweight costs from bankruptcy in CDF. They may be substitutes (complements), such that the marginal e¤ect of one decreases (increases) with an increase in the other. We test for this interactive e¤ect on the likelihood of PF along with our tests of the individual investor protection variables.
Given our cross-country setting, inferring a causal relationship between country-level investor protection laws and the deal-level choice between PF and CDF presents several challenges. First, country-level laws governing insider stealing and creditor rights may be correlated with other country-level unobserved factors. Second, agency cost considerations are not the sole motivation for PF. Proving our agency cost story requires that we account for other possible motivations as well -most importantly, those relating to asset choice, debt overhang, and risk management (Esty 2003) . Third, potential sample selection problems could bias our results.
To address such econometric concerns, we undertake di¤erence-in-di¤erence tests that exploit exogenous country-level changes in (i) creditor rights; and (ii) laws relating to shareholder derivative suits, which a¤ect shareholders'legal protection. We compare within-country di¤erences in the incidence of PF before and after the exogenous legal changes vis-à-vis the before-after di¤erence in countries where there was no such legal change. These time-series tests alleviate endogeneity concerns on many key dimensions and thereby o¤er the strongest evidence supporting our hypotheses.
The economic e¤ect of changes in investor protection on the choice of PF versus CDF is significant. In our di¤erence-in-di¤erence tests, a decrease in creditor rights increases the likelihood of PF by 5.2% and increases the marginal e¤ect of protection against insider stealing by 24.2%. Also, an improvement in shareholders'right to derivative suits decreases the likelihood of PF by 10.8% and decreases the marginal e¤ect of creditor rights by 32.4%.
Our key contribution is to o¤er a new illustration that law matters, this time in the context of debt …nancing of large investment projects. Stronger investor protection laws enhance debt capacity in CDF by improving borrowers' ability to credibly commit ex-ante that they will not strategically default ex-post. Like concentrated ownership for equity investors (LaPorta et al.
1998), PF represents the private response of …rms and their investors -here, lenders -to weak investor protection. By employing PF as a counter-factual to CDF, our results imply that stronger legal protection against insider stealing and/or stronger creditor rights in bankruptcy encourage CDF by obviating the need for a costly and specialized form of …nancing such as PF. To our knowledge, our study is the …rst to o¤er such large sample cross-country evidence. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 explains the key institutional features of PF. Section 4 describes our empirical hypotheses. Section 5 details our sample and proxies while Section 6 presents the empirical results. Section 7 provides further discussion of our results. Section 8 concludes the paper.
Review of Literature
As a broad research inquiry, our paper is closely related to the law and …nance literature (see LLSV, 1997 LLSV, , 1998 Djankov et. al., 2006; Djankov et. al., 2007) . While this literature o¤ers evidence that legal origins have important implications for the pattern of …nancial organization within a country, the exact mechanism for this e¤ect has been unclear. In this paper, we show that legal origin matters through the provision of investor protection by reducing the e¤ect of agency costs on …nancing choices. By identifying a micro channel for the e¤ect of legal origins on …nancing outcomes, this paper complements Qian and Strahan (2007) , who …nd evidence that country level legal and institutional variables a¤ect various price and non-price features of debt contracts. This paper augments the literature examining PF as an optimal organizational and …nancing choice. Like our study, Chemmanur and John (1996) focus on the cash ‡ow aspect of PF. In their formal analysis, they assert that the key ingredient of PF is the segregation of project cash ‡ows from those of the sponsor. They show inter alia that PF would dominate other alternatives when the structure of the sponsor's private control bene…ts di¤ers substantially across its projects. 3 In contrast to Chemmanur and John (1996) , we argue informally here that the (lack of) veri…ability of cash ‡ows in (CDF) PF, and therefore the (higher) lower private bene…ts, arise endogenously because of the nature of the contracts that can (not) be written in (CDF) PF. Esty (2003) articulates the important institutional details of PF and argues that the governance structure of project companies combines with high leverage to mitigate agency con ‡icts. He supports his analysis with detailed case studies and …eld research. Berkovitch and Kim (1990) formally show that if information between debtholders and equityholders is symmetric, PF simultaneously alleviates the problems of under-and over-investment. We complement Esty (2003) and Berkovitch and Kim (1990) by employing a large sample of international loans to demonstrate empirically that PF o¤ers a private substitute for legal rules designed to reduce agency con ‡icts.
Other studies have examined the relationship between PF and legal environments. Company to own and invest in the project. Second, the Project Company invests only in the particular project for which it is created; it is typically dissolved once the project is completed.
Third, the project debt is structured without recourse to the sponsors (Nevitt and Fabozzi, 2000; Esty, 2003) . These three features together imply that cash ‡ows from the project are the essential means to repay the lender. This observation leads to the fourth essential aspect of PF, which has gone underemphasized in the literature but is the focus of our analysis: PF includes severe constraints on the use and disposition of project cash ‡ows. Compared to CDF, the sponsoring …rms have considerably reduced discretion over project cash ‡ows. PF also typically involves very high leverage, the bulk of which is in the form of bank debt.
In PF, project cash ‡ows can be easily separated from those of the sponsor since the Project Company is legally independent and consists of a single project. This enables the Project Company to enter into detailed arrangements with its lenders concerning the use of cash, including private enforcement through lender-controlled project accounts. This extremely detailed control of cash ‡ow is unique to PF, which is why it is sometimes referred to as "contractual …nance." (Esty and Megginson, 2003) .
The cash ‡ow waterfall contract dictates the order in which project cash ‡ows may be distributed. Typically, the borrower is required to use project cash ‡ows …rst in satisfaction of operating expenses, and then to pay interest and loan principal. The contract also structures how excess cash ‡ow -cash ‡ow available in excess of what is required to satisfy project expenses and debt repayment -is distributed. The contract adjusts the borrower's repayment schedule for a number of contingencies based on pre-de…ned …nancial ratios. The contract commonly includes "cash sharing", "lockup"and "mandatory cash sweep"provisions, which are designed to e¤ectively amortize debt at a rate faster than originally scheduled if the project performs appreciably better or appreciably worse than anticipated.
The waterfall arrangement is enforced through a variety of project accounts that are typically under the lender's control. These include (i) a proceeds account, into which project revenues are deposited; (ii) a disbursement account, into which all payments to the lender and any distributions to equityholders are deposited; and (iii) a debt service reserve account, in which cash ‡ows are set aside to enable payment of principal and interest in case project revenues are not available.
Since these accounts are controlled by the lender, they provide the lender a framework to monitor the borrower's activities without getting involved in the borrower's day-to-day business activities.
These lender-controlled project accounts lend teeth to the elaborate and …nely-tuned contracting undertaken in the cash ‡ow waterfall contract. These teeth matter especially in countries with weak legal environments, where writing and enforcing contracts may be especially costly.
Empirical Hypotheses
We test the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, CDF is more likely than PF in countries where the protection against insider stealing is stronger.
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, CDF is more likely than PF in countries where creditor rights in bankruptcy are stronger.
In addition to these hypotheses, we also examine the interactive e¤ect of creditor rights and legal protection against insider stealing. Creditor rights and laws against insider stealing may be substitutes because creditor rights matter only in bankruptcy, and stronger legal protection against insider stealing lowers the likelihood of bankruptcy. Similarly, stronger laws against insider stealing may have a weaker marginal e¤ect on the likelihood of default when stronger creditor rights exist to induce repayment. On the other hand, one might also imagine that stronger laws against insider stealing may complement stronger creditor rights and vice versa. This is because stronger investor protection on both fronts may enhance their separate deterrent e¤ects on insider opportunism.
Data, Sample and Proxies

Sample
We test our predictions using bank loans for PF and CDF from LPC Dealscan. Eighty percent of the debt in PF comprises bank debt (Esty, 2003) , which is typically in the form of large internationally syndicated loans, where Dealscan's international coverage is the best among available data sources (Qian and Strahan, 2007) .
We carefully identify categories of CDF loans such that for each loan in our sample, the counterfactual choice between PF and our sampled categories of CDF is plausible. To determine which CDF loans to include, we rely on Dealscan's attribution of the primary purpose for each loan, as well as industry classi…cation. Since PF involves the creation of "a single purpose capital asset" (Esty, 2003) , CDF loans with "Capital Expenditures" as their primary purpose o¤er a natural set of counterfactuals to PF. Indeed, Panel A of Table 1 reveals that the deal amounts for Capital Expenditure and PF loans are very similar. The distributions of Capital Expenditure and PF loans are also similar with respect to loan maturity and the number of lenders.
In addition to Capital Expenditure loans, we also include large term loans for "Corporate Purposes" in our sampled CDF loans. Since PF involves large investments, large term loans for "Corporate Purposes"comprise another category where the counterfactual choice of PF is plausible.
Consistent with the minimum deal amount (converted in dollars) for PF loans, which is $0.5 million, we exclude all Corporate Purpose Term Loans with deal amounts (converted in dollars) less than $0.5 million. After this exclusion, we …nd in Panel A of Table 1 that the mean and median loan amounts for Corporate Purpose term loans are slightly smaller than that for PF loans. Examining the distributions for deal size, loan maturity and number of lenders across the three loan categories suggests the distribution of loans is very similar for both CDF and PF. 4 Since the creditor rights variables do not extend beyond 2002, our sample includes loans originated from 1993 to 2003. Our …nal deal-level sample contains 5,005 deals from 39 countries. 5 This collection of countries is identical to that in Qian and Strahan (2007). Table 2 provides a summary of all the explanatory variables and their sources. In the spirit of Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) , where the ex-ante …nancing outcome is a¤ected by the ex-post likelihood of a sponsor/manager being caught stealing, our proxy for protection against insider stealing is the index of ex-post private control of self-dealing constructed by Djankov, LaPorta, Lopez-de-Salinas and Shleifer (2006) (DLLS). This measure captures the extent of ex-post disclosure that the controlling shareholder must provide in order to engage in a self-dealing transaction and the ease of proving wrongdoing once such a transaction is detected. 6 We use the creditor rights index constructed in Djankov, McLeish and Shleifer (2007) (DMS) to proxy for creditor rights. A higher value for the DMS index indicates stronger creditor rights.
Key Explanatory Variables
Results
We undertake a step-wise analysis to infer a causal relationship between country-level laws and the deal-level choice between PF and CDF. 
Preliminary Evidence
Empirical Strategy
Inferring a causal relationship between PF and investor protection laws presents a challenge insofar as the relationship may be driven by country-level unobserved factors. 7 First, since PF involves an asset choice as well as a …nancing choice (Esty, 2003) , it may be employed relatively more than CDF in industries that employ assets involving costly agency con ‡icts. Second, the pattern of industries in di¤erent countries is potentially correlated systematically with country-wide unobserved factors, which could drive the choice of PF in these industries. Third, di¤erences in tax rates and tax treatment of debt across di¤erent countries may a¤ect the choice of PF.
Fourth, other omitted variables at the country level may be correlated with our legal variables of interest. To identify our hypothesized e¤ects, we conduct di¤erence-in-di¤erence tests that exploit within-country di¤erences in the usage of PF relating to exogenous changes in legal rules.
Di¤erence-in-di¤erence Tests Exploiting Exogenous Legal Changes
To identify the causal e¤ect of investor protection on PF, we exploit exogenous country-level changes in creditor rights and in shareholders'right to bring derivative suits.
Countries di¤er with respect to the rights they o¤er creditors during bankruptcy. The DMS creditor rights index assigns each country an index value from 0 to 4 based on how many of the following four creditor rights are recognized in bankruptcy: (i) no automatic stay applies to secured creditors'rights; (ii) secured creditors are paid …rst in bankruptcy; (iii) no majority creditor consent is required for reorganization; and (iv) management does not stay in place upon bankruptcy. Panel A of Table 3 shows the countries that underwent a change in creditor rights during our sample period. All these countries decreased the level of creditor rights, causing reduced DMS creditor rights index values.
A shareholder derivative suit is an action brought by a shareholder of a company in the name and on behalf of that company in order to seek redress for a harm done to the company by the company's directors or o¢ cers. 8 Some countries restrict such suits based on the size of the putative shareholder-plainti¤'s holdings in the …rm. Others may impose a demand requirement, which forces the shareholder …rst to petition the company's board for redress before suit may proceed. Wider availability of shareholder derivative suits imposes stronger constraints on insider stealing, and this legal feature is included as a component of the DLLS index of ex-post private control of self-dealing.
Panel B of Table 3 shows the countries that underwent a change in shareholders'right to bring derivative suits. This list is constructed from Siems et. al. (2008) , as well as searches for changes in these laws in our sample countries through Lexis-Nexis Global. All these countries improved shareholders' derivative suit rights during our sample period. Three countries -Germany, Italy and Mexico -lowered the minimum ownership requirements for shareholders to …le derivative suits, while Australia instituted the mechanism of shareholder derivative suits. 9 Since the countries that e¤ected changes in creditor rights do not overlap with countries that changed shareholder derivative suit rights, we can cleanly infer the e¤ect of each of these changes.
The di¤erence-in-di¤erence regressions that we implement below require the identifying assumption that absent the legal changes, the percentage of PF would evolve similarly in all countries. 8 Because the …rm's top managers-who ordinarily decide for the company who it will or will not sue-cannot generally be expected to subject themselves to suit by the company, shareholders are given the right to sue management in the company's name. Such an action is "derivative" in the sense that the right to sue belongs not to the party actually bringing the action, but is 'derived' from the company's rights. Given that it is the company's rights that are sought to be vindicated in such an action, the proceeds of a successful action are awarded to the corporation and not to the individual shareholders that initiated the suit. 9 Siems et. al. (2008) note that the changes in the shareholders'ability to initiate derivative suits were part of a rising trend for shareholder protection in various countries. 
Changes in Creditor Rights
First, we exploit exogenous changes in creditor rights to test the following model:
where y kct is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the bank loan deal to borrower k in country c in year t is PF and 0 if the deal corresponds to a capital expenditure loan or a corporate purpose term loan (our two categories of CDF loans); and c is the DLLS measure of ex-post private control of self-dealing in country c. To re ‡ect the decrease in creditor rights that occurred in some countries but not others, Change_in_Creditor_Rights ct equals 1 for country c and years t m if creditor rights decreased in country c in year m, and equals 0 otherwise. k and t denote borrower and year …xed e¤ects respectively. Since a borrower's country and industry do not change through time, borrower …xed e¤ects subsume the country and industry …xed e¤ects. The coe¢ cient 1 measures as a di¤erence-in-di¤erence the direct e¤ect of the change in creditor rights on PF while 2 captures as a di¤erence-in-di¤erence the interaction of creditor rights with our proxy for protection against insider stealing. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, we predict that 1 < 0. To ensure that country-level changes in protection against insider stealing do not a¤ect our results, we exclude those countries that underwent a change in shareholders'right to derivative suits.
Column (1) of Table 4 presents results of estimating equation (1) . Column (2) repeats speci…cation (1) with (country*industry) …xed e¤ects instead of borrower …xed e¤ects. To avoid an extraordinarily large number of dummies, we de…ne industries as in Panel B of Table 1 . In both
Columns (1) and (2), we …nd that 1 < 0 and is statistically signi…cant, thereby con…rming Hypothesis 2. We also …nd that 2 > 0 and is statistically signi…cant in both estimations, consistent with the suggestion in Figure 3 that creditor rights and laws against insider stealing are substitutes, not complements. Using Column (1), we estimate the economic e¤ect as follows. Compared to countries that did not undergo a change in creditor rights, the decrease in creditor rights in the countries in our sample increased the likelihood of PF by 5.2% and increased the marginal e¤ect of protection against insider stealing by 24.2%.
We next aggregate deals at the 4-digit SIC level i in country c in year t and estimate the following OLS regression that includes country, year and industry …xed e¤ects:
Column (3) shows that our results remain strong in this speci…cation.
Changes in Shareholders'Right to Derivative Suits
Using exogenous changes in shareholders'right to derivative suits, we test the following model:
where ct denotes the level of creditor rights in country c in year t. y kct ; k and t are de…ned as in captures as a di¤erence-in-di¤erence the interaction of creditor rights with a change in derivative suit rules. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, we predict that 1 < 0. To ensure that country-level changes in creditor rights do not a¤ect our results, we exclude from these regressions those countries that underwent a change in creditor rights.
Column (4) of Table 4 presents results of the above test. In Column (5), we repeat speci…cation (3) by including (country * industry) …xed e¤ects and year …xed e¤ects. In Column (6), we run an OLS regression using the industry level sample after including country, year and industry …xed e¤ects as in Column (3). Across all these speci…cations, we …nd that 1 < 0 and 2 > 0, and these coe¢ cients are signi…cant statistically (except for 2 in Column (5)). Using column (4), we estimate the economic e¤ect as follows. Compared to countries that did not undergo a change, an improvement in shareholders'right to derivative suits decreased the likelihood of PF by 10.8% and decreased the marginal e¤ect of creditor rights by 32.4%.
Discussion
The di¤erence-in-di¤erence tests above alleviate important endogeneity concerns described in Section 6.3, since the tests exploit variation across time in the choice of PF vis-à-vis CDF within a given industry in a given country. The tests thus compare deals with similar assets in the same country, before and after a law change, against a control group of deals that involve no such law change. In particular, the …xed e¤ects at the (country*industry) levels account for any unobserved di¤erences in the choice of PF due to di¤erent e¤ective tax rates and tax treatment of debt across di¤erent industries within a country. These tests therefore provide strong evidence that it is not endogenous country-level or country-and industry-level factors that drive our results.
Addressing Sample Selection Concerns
The fortuity of the above-described exogenous legal changes also enables us to use di¤erence-in-di¤erence tests to address sample selection issues that might potentially bias our results.
Counting Financing Deals versus Counting Projects
First, our sample is comprised of …nancing deals, as opposed to projects, and we implicitly assume a one-to-one correspondence between …nancing deals and projects. It is possible, however, that this assumption is incorrect. For example, CDF projects might sometimes require more than one round of …nancing, and the number of rounds might vary with investor protection. In that case, our count of CDF deals would overstate the likelihood of CDF by treating multiple …nancings of the same project as separate …nancings for separate projects.
However, our di¤erence-in-di¤erence tests using exogenous country-level legal changes mitigate this concern. First, our within-country analysis ensures that our results are not an artifact of timeinvarying di¤erences across countries. Second, any time-invarying biases that manifest di¤erently across di¤erent industries in di¤erent countries are also captured by our (country*industry) …xed e¤ects in Columns (2) and (5) of Table 4 . To the extent that the e¤ects of sample selection bias of this nature do not change signi…cantly across time, the di¤erence-in-di¤erence tests provide robust evidence that such bias does not drive our results.
It might still be possible that sample selection problems explain our results of Table 4 Table 4 , con…rming our hypothesis.
We also test directly for this possible sample selection bias in Table 5 . If a decrease in creditor rights led to more CDF …nancing rounds of shorter maturity per project in our sample, we should observe shorter average maturity for CDF loans following the legal change. Columns (1)-(2) of Table 5 show no signi…cant change in CDF loan maturity following a decrease in creditor rights.
Therefore, we conclude that this sample selection problem is unlikely to be driving our results.
Alternatives to CDF
A second sample selection concern involves the existence of …nancing alternatives to CDF besides PF that we have not considered in our analysis. Equity …nancing, public debt, and internal …nancing at the sponsor level may also be potential alternatives to CDF. If the choice between CDF and any of these alternatives varies with investor protection, this could bias our results.
First, consider equity …nancing. Since dispersed equity is relatively unattractive to investors in countries with weak investor protection, equity …nancing is relatively more likely to displace PF in countries with strong investor protection. Therefore, we are likely to undercount the equity-…nanced alternatives to PF by a greater margin in countries with stronger investor protection. Consequently, compared to the use of PF in the population, our neglect of equity …nancing possibilities leads us to overestimate the likelihood of PF in countries with strong investor protection. But our hypothesis is that PF is used relatively less in countries with strong investor protection, so this bias works against our hypothesis. In a similar vein, dispersed public debt o¤ers a practical alternative to PF only in countries with well-developed corporate bond markets, which are correlated with strong investor protection as well. Therefore, as with the equity …nancing alternative, the public debt alternative also stacks the odds against our …nding results consistent with our central hypothesis.
Finally, consider internal …nancing. We anticipate two o¤setting dynamics here. First, in countries with weak investor protection, managers are more likely to steal, which may make internal …nancing less likely because managers would rather steal free cash than invest it. Second, in weak legal regimes, information asymmetry may be severe, causing external …nancing alternatives to be scarce and leaving internal …nancing as the only alternative. Thus, the overall e¤ect of investor protection on internal …nancing may be positive or negative. Irrespective of this net e¤ect, our di¤erence-in-di¤erence tests in Table 4 control for any time-invarying levels of over-or underestimation in the percentage of PF deals at both the country-level and the country-industry level.
However, it is possible that following the legal changes we identify, …rms altered the proportion of projects that were internally …nanced. To investigate this possibility, we test using the subsample of our borrower …rms for which …nancial data are available in Global Compustat. 10 Since Rajan
and Zingales (1998) de…ne external …nancing as one minus the ratio of Cash Flow from Operations to Capital Expenditures, we use the ratio of Cash Flow from Operations to Capital Expenditures as our measure of internal …nancing. 11 Columns (3)- (4) of Table 5 show the results of our tests, which include …rm and year …xed e¤ects. We …nd that changes in legal protection had no signi…cant e¤ect on internal …nancing employed by …rms in our sample. Therefore, we conclude that our primary …ndings are not an artifact of under-or over-estimation of the likelihood of PF from a failure to consider internal …nancing as an alternative …nancing device.
Deal Size and Dealscan
Finally, besides a¤ecting the choice of PF versus CDF, investor protection might also a¤ect deal size in a way that biases our results, because the Dealscan database includes only large deals.
Suppose that creditor rights do not a¤ect the likelihood of PF at all, but instead are positively correlated with CDF loan size. CDF might be as likely relative to PF in countries with weak creditor rights as those with strong creditor rights, but the smaller CDF loans in weaker creditor rights countries would drop out of Dealscan's coverage, biasing our sample in favor of our hypotheses.
Our tests would be a¤ected only if this (unobserved) sampling bias is correlated with the legal changes discussed earlier. In other words, Dealscan's coverage would have had to change systematically within a given country after a legal change. We test for this possibility using the logarithm of deal size as the dependent variable. The results in columns (5)- (6) of Table 5 show no signi…cant change in deal size coinciding with the legal changes. In unreported tests, we also investigate whether the legal changes a¤ect deal size for the separate subsamples of PF and CDF loans. We …nd no statistically signi…cant change in deal size coinciding with the legal changes for either sub-sample. Therefore, we do not believe our results are driven by this sampling criterion.
In sum, our di¤erence-in di¤erence tests relying on exogenous legal changes enable us to mitigate endogeneity concerns as well as sample selection concerns. Our tests therefore provide strong support for the causal e¤ect of investor protection laws on the choice of PF versus CDF.
Distinguishing PF from Related Mechanisms
We have explained PF as a unique arrangement with both organizational and contractual features that work in tandem to o¤er a private substitute for investor protection laws by making Project cash ‡ows veri…able. Here, we distinguish PF from related organizational and contractual mechanisms, which o¤er features similar to PF, but which are by themselves insu¢ cient to make cash ‡ows veri…able. 
Figure 2: Percentage of Project Finance versus Creditor Rights
The y-axis plots the percentage of Project Finance deals in a country while the x-axis plots the DMS creditor rights index. Higher values indicate greater creditor rights. The y-axis plots the percentage of Project Finance deals in countries where there was (i) a change in creditor rights; and (ii) neither a change in creditor rights nor a change in rules governing shareholder derivatives suits.
Figure 5: Percentage of Project Finance (Countries with and without Changes in Derivative Suit Rules)
The y-axis plots the percentage of Project Finance deals in countries where there was (i) a change in rules governing shareholder derivative suits; and (ii) neither a change in creditor rights nor a change in rules governing shareholder derivatives suits. Columns 1-3 report results relating to changes in creditor rights. Columns 1-2 report logit results using a deal-level sample with year fixed effects. Columns 1 uses borrower fixed effects as well while column 2 uses country*industry fixed effects. Column 3 reports OLS results using an industry-level sample with country, industry and year fixed effects. Columns 4-6 report results relating to changes in shareholder derivative suit rights. Columns 4-5 report logit results using a deal-level sample with year fixed effects. Column 4 uses borrower fixed effects as well while Column 5 uses country*industry fixed effects. Column 6 reports OLS results using an industry-level sample with country, industry, and year fixed effects. T-statistics computed using robust standard errors clustered by the country of the borrower are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) All OLS regressions employ country, year and industry fixed effects. T-statistics computed using robust standard errors clustered by the country of the borrower are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * represent coefficients that are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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